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Multi-vehicle Cooperative Control Using Mixed
Integer Linear Programming
Matthew G. Earl and Raffaello D’Andrea
Abstract— We present methods to synthesize cooperative
strategies for multi-vehicle control problems using mixed integer
linear programming. Complex multi-vehicle control problems are
expressed as mixed logical dynamical systems. Optimal strategies
for these systems are then solved for using mixed integer linear
programming. We motivate the methods on problems derived
from an adversarial game between two teams of robots called
RoboFlag. We assume the strategy for one team is fixed and
governed by state machines. The strategy for the other team is
generated using our methods. Finally, we perform an average
case computational complexity study on our approach.
Index Terms— Cooperative robotics, multi-vehicle systems,
mixed integer linear programming, robot motion planning, path
and trajectory planning, hybrid systems, mathematical optimiza-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
For many problems, a team of vehicles can accomplish
an objective more efficiently and more effectively than a
single vehicle can. Some examples include target intercept [2],
search [4], terrain mapping [24], object manipulation [38],
surveillance, and space-based interferometry. For these prob-
lems, it is desirable to design a multi-vehicle cooperative
control strategy.
There is a large literature on cooperative control. Work
from team theory [25], [21] considers the case where team
members have different information and the objective func-
tion is quadratic. Cooperative estimation for reconnaissance
problems is considered in [30]. In [32], [6], [16] mixed integer
linear programming is used for multi-vehicle target assignment
and intercept problems. Hierarchical methods are used for
cooperative rendezvous in [27] and for target assignment
and intercept in [2]. A review from the machine learning
perspective is presented in [35]. There are several recent
compilations of cooperative control articles in [1], [5], [28].
In this paper, we propose a hybrid systems approach for
modeling and cooperative control of multi-vehicle systems.
We use the class of hybrid systems called mixed logical
dynamical systems [7], which are governed by difference
equations and logical rules and are subject to linear inequality
constraints. The main motivation for using mixed logical
dynamical systems is their ability to model a wide variety
of multi-vehicle problems and the ease of modifying problem
formulations. In our approach, a problem is modeled as a
mixed logical dynamical system, which we represent as a
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mixed integer linear program (MILP). Then, to generate a
cooperative control strategy for the system, the MILP is solved
using AMPL [19] and CPLEX [22].
Posing a multi-vehicle control problem in a MILP frame-
work involves modeling the vehicle dynamics and constraints,
modeling the environment, and expressing the objective. To
demonstrate the modeling procedure and our approach, we
consider control problems involving Cornell’s multi-vehicle
system called RoboFlag. For an introduction to RoboFlag,
see the papers from the invited session on RoboFlag in the
Proceedings of the 2003 American Control Conference [10],
[12], [13].
Our focus is to find optimal solutions using a flexible
methodology, which is why we use MILP. However, because
MILP is in the NP-hard computation class [20], the methods
may not be fast enough for real-time control of systems
with large problem formulations. In this case, the methods
can be used to explore optimal cooperative behavior and as
benchmarks to evaluate the performance of heuristic or ap-
proximate methods. In Section VI, we discuss several methods
for reducing the computational requirements of our MILP
approach so that it can be more readily used in real-time
applications.
Our approach for multi-vehicle control, first presented
in [15], [16], was developed independently from a similar
approach developed by Richards et. al. [33]. Next, we list
some of the noteworthy aspects of our approach. First, the
environment which we demonstrate our methods involves
an adversarial component. We model the intelligence of the
adversaries with state machines. Second, our approach al-
lows multiple, possibly nonuniform, time discretizations. Dis-
cretizing continuous variables in time is necessary for MILP
formulations. Using many time steps results in large MILPs
that require a considerable amount of computation time to
solve. Support for nonuniform discretizations in time allows
the use of intelligent time step selection algorithms for the
generation of more efficient MILP problem formulations [17].
Finally, because we include the vehicle dynamics in the
problem formulation, the resulting trajectories are feasible,
which is advantageous because they can be applied directly
to the multi-vehicle system. In order to express the vehicle
dynamics efficiently in our MILP formulation, we restrict the
control input to each vehicle in a way that allows near-optimal
performance, as presented in [29].
The paper is organized as follows: First, we consider vehicle
problems that have relatively simple formulations. Then we
add features in each section until we arrive at the RoboFlag
multi-vehicle problems. In Section II, we introduce the dy-
namics of the vehicles used to motivate our approach, and
2we formulate and solve a single vehicle minimum control
effort trajectory generation problem. We build upon this in
Section III adding obstacles that must be avoided. In Sec-
tion IV, we show how to generate optimal team strategies for
RoboFlag problems. In Section V, we perform an average case
computational complexity study on our approach. Finally, in
Section VI, we discuss our methods and ways in which they
can be be applied. All files for generating the plots found in
this paper are available online [18].
II. VEHICLE DYNAMICS
Multi-vehicle control problems involving the wheeled robots
of Cornell’s RoboCup Team [14], [37] are used to motivate
the methods presented in this paper. In this section, we show
how to simplify their nonlinear governing equations using a
procedure from [29]. The result is a linear set of governing
equations coupled by a nonlinear constraint on the control
input, which admits feasible vehicle trajectories and allows
near-optimal performance. We then show how to represent the
simplified system in a MILP problem formulation.
Each vehicle has a three-motor omni-directional drive,
which allows it to move along any direction irrespective of its
orientation. The nondimensional governing equations of each
vehicle are given by
 x¨(t)y¨(t)
θ¨(t)

+

 x˙(t)y˙(t)
2mL2
I
θ˙(t)

 = u(θ(t), t), (1)
where u(θ(t), t) = P(θ(t))U(t),
P(θ) =

 − sin(θ) − sin(pi3 − θ) sin(pi3 + θ)cos(θ) − cos(pi3 − θ) − cos(pi3 + θ)
1 1 1

 , (2)
and U(t) = (Ux(t), Uy(t), Uz(t)) ∈ U . In these equations,
(x(t), y(t)) are the coordinates of the vehicle on the playing
field, θ(t) is the orientation of the vehicle, u(θ(t), t) is the
θ(t)-dependent control input, m is the mass of the vehicle, I
is the vehicle’s moment of inertia, L is the distance from the
drive to the center of mass, and Ui(t) is the voltage applied
to motor i. The set of admissible voltages U is given by the
unit cube, and the set of admissible control inputs is given by
P (θ)U .
These governing equations are coupled and nonlinear. To
simplify them, we replace the set P (θ)U with the maximal θ-
independent set found by taking the intersection of all possible
sets of admissible controls. The result is a θ-independent
control input, denoted (ux(t), uy(t), uz(t)), that is subject to
the inequality constraints ux(t)2 + uy(t)2 ≤ (3− |uθ(t)|)2/4
and |uθ(t)| ≤ 3.
Using the restricted set as the set of allowable control inputs,
the governing equations decouple and are given by
 x¨(t)y¨(t)
θ¨(t)

+

 x˙(t)y˙(t)
2mL2
I
θ˙(t)

 =

 ux(t)uy(t)
uθ(t)

 . (3)
The constraints on the control input couple the degrees of
freedom.
To decouple the θ dynamics, we set |uθ(t)| ≤ 1. Then the
constraint on the control input becomes
ux(t)
2 + uy(t)
2 ≤ 1. (4)
Now the equations of motion for the translational dynamics
of the vehicle are given by
x¨(t) + x˙(t) = ux(t),
y¨(t) + y˙(t) = uy(t), (5)
subject to equation (4). In state space form, equation (5) is
x˙(t) = Acx(t) + Bcu(t), where x = (x, y, x˙, y˙) is the state
and u = (ux, uy) is the control input.
By restricting the admissible control inputs we have simpli-
fied the governing equations in a way that allows near optimal
performance as shown in [29]. This procedure allows real-time
calculation of many near-optimal trajectories and has been
successfully used by Cornell’s RoboCup team [14], [37], [29].
To represent the governing equations in a MILP framework,
we discretize the control input in time and require it be
constant between time steps. The result is a set of linear
discrete time governing equations.
Let Nu be the number of discretization steps for the control
input u(t), let tu[k] be the time at step k, and let Tu[k] > 0 be
the time between steps k and k+1, for k ∈ {0, . . . , Nu− 1}.
The discrete time governing equations are given by
xu[k + 1] = A[k]xu[k] +B[k]u[k], (6)
where xu[k] = x(tu[k]), u[k] = u(tu[k]),
A[k] =


1 0 1− e−Tu[k] 0
0 1 0 1− e−Tu[k]
0 0 e−Tu[k] 0
0 0 0 e−Tu[k]

 ,
B[k] =


Tu[k]− 1 + e−Tu[k] 0
0 Tu[k]− 1 + e−Tu[k]
1− e−Tu[k] 0
0 1− e−Tu[k]

 ,
xu[k] = (xu[k], yu[k], x˙u[k], y˙u[k]), and u[k] =
(ux[k], uy[k]). The coefficients A[k] and B[k] are functions
of k because we have allowed for nonuniform time
discretizations. Because there will be several different time
discretizations used in this paper, we use subscripts to
differentiate them. In this section, we use the subscript u
to denote variables associated with the discretization in the
control input u(t).
The discrete time governing equations can be solved explic-
itly to obtain
xu[k] = xu[0] +
(
1− e−tu[k]
)
x˙u[0]
+
k−2∑
i=0
((
Tu[i]− 1 + e−Tu[i]
)
ux[i]
+
(
1− etu[i+1]−tu[k]
)(
1− e−Tu[i]
)
ux[i]
)
+
(
Tu[k − 1]− 1 + e−Tu[k−1]
)
ux[k − 1],
3x˙u[k] = e
−tu[k]x˙u[0]
+
k−2∑
i=0
(
etu[i+1]−tu[k]
(
1− e−Tu[i]
)
ux[i]
)
+
(
1− e−Tu[k−1]
)
ux[k − 1],
and similarly for yu[k] and y˙u[k].
In later sections of this paper it will be necessary to
represent the position of the vehicle at times between control
discretization steps, in terms of the control input. Because the
set of governing equations is linear, given the discrete state
xu[k] and the control input u[k], we can calculate the vehicle’s
state at any time t using the following equations:
x(t) = xu[k] + (1− etu[k]−t)x˙u[k]
+ (t− tu[k]− 1 + etu[k]−t)ux[k],
x˙(t) = (etu[k]−t)x˙u[k] + (1− etu[k]−t)ux[k], (7)
where k satisfies tu[k] ≤ t ≤ tu[k + 1]. If the time
discretization of the control input is uniform, Tu[ku] = Tu
for all ku, then ku = ⌊t/Tu⌋. The other components of the
vehicle’s state, y(t) and y˙(t), can be calculated in a similar
way.
The control input constraint given by equation (4) cannot
be expressed in a MILP framework because it is nonlinear.
To incorporate this constraint we approximate it with a set of
linear inequalities that define a polygon. The polygon inscribes
the region defined by the nonlinear constraint. We take the
conservative inscribing polygon to guarantee that the set of
allowable controls, defined by the region, is feasible. We define
the polygon by the set of Mu linear inequality constraints
ux[k] sin
2πm
Mu
+ uy[k] cos
2πm
Mu
≤ cos π
Mu
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mu}, (8)
for each step k ∈ {1, . . . , Nu}.
To illustrate the approach, we consider the following min-
imum control effort trajectory generation problem. Given a
vehicle governed by equations (6) and (8), find the sequence
of control inputs {u[k]}Nu−1k=0 that transfers the vehicle from
starting state x(0) = xs to finishing state x(tf ) = xf and
minimizes the cost function
J =
Nu−1∑
k=0
(|ux[k]|+ |uy[k]|) . (9)
To convert the absolute values in the cost function to linear
form, we introduce auxiliary continuous variables zx[k] and
zy[k] and the inequality constraints
−zx[k] ≤ ux[k] ≤ zx[k]
−zy[k] ≤ uy[k] ≤ zy[k]. (10)
Minimizing zx[k] subject to the inequalities ux[k] ≤ zx[k] and
ux[k] ≥ −zx[k] is equivalent to minimizing |ux[k]| (similarly
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Fig. 1. Plots of the minimum control effort example. Figure (a) shows
the vehicle trajectory in the (x, y) plane. The circle and dotted line denote
the initial position and velocity, respectively. The square denotes the final
position. Figures (b)–(d) show the time histories of the control inputs, the
positions, and the velocities, respectively. The solid lines in Figures (b)–(d)
represent x components and the dotted lines represent y components. The
values for the parameters are Nu = 10, Mu = 20, Tu[k] = 0.3 for all
k, (x0, y0, x˙0, y˙0) = (−0.25,−0.2,−0.5,−0.2), and (xf , yf , x˙f , y˙f ) =
(0.4, 0.3, 0.0, 0.0).
for |uy[k]|) [8]. Using the auxiliary variables, the cost function
can be written as a linear function,
J =
Nu−1∑
k=0
(zx[k] + zy[k]) . (11)
The resulting optimization problem (minimize (11) subject
to (6), (8), (10), and the boundary conditions) is in MILP
form. Because binary variables do not appear in the problem
formulation, it is a linear program and is easily solved to obtain
the optimal sequence of control inputs. The solution for an
example instance is shown in Figure 1.
III. OBSTACLE AVOIDANCE
In vehicle control, it is necessary to avoid other vehicles,
stationary and moving obstacles, and restricted regions. In this
section, we show how to formulate and solve these avoidance
problems using MILP. We start by showing a MILP method
to guarantee circular obstacle avoidance at No discrete times.
The version of this method developed in [34], and a similar
version developed independently in in [15], [16], uniformly
distributes obstacle avoidance times. Here we present a version
of the method that allows nonuniform distributions of obstacle
avoidance times.
The subscript o is used to denote variables associated with
the time discretization for obstacle avoidance. For step k, taken
to be an element of the set {1, . . . , No}, let to[k] be the time
at which obstacle avoidance is enforced. Let Robst denote
the radius of the obstacle. Let (xobst[k], yobst[k]) denote the
coordinates of its center at time to[k]. We approximate the
obstacle with a polygon, denoted O[k], defined by a set of
4Mo inequalities. The polygon is given by
O[k] := { (x¯, y¯) :
(x¯− xobst[k]) sin 2πm
Mo
+ (y¯ − yobst[k]) cos 2πm
Mo
≤ Robst
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mo} }. (12)
To guarantee obstacle avoidance at time to[k], the coordi-
nates of the vehicle must be outside the region O[k]. This
avoidance condition can be written as (xo[k], yo[k]) /∈ O[k],
where (xo[k], yo[k]) are the coordinates of the vehicle at
time to[k]. Here xo[k] = x(to[k]) and yo[k] = y(to[k]) are
expressed in terms of the control inputs using equation (7).
Because at least one constraint defining the region O[k]
must be violated in order to avoid the obstacle, the avoidance
condition is equivalent to the following condition:
there exists an m such that
(xo[k]− xobst[k]) sin 2πm
Mo
+ (yo[k]− yobst[k]) cos 2πm
Mo
> Robst. (13)
To express this avoidance constraint in a MILP problem
formulation, it must be converted to an equivalent set of linear
inequality constraints. We do so by introducing auxiliary bi-
nary variable bm[k] ∈ {0, 1} and the following Mo inequality
constraints,
(xo[k]− xobst[k]) sin 2πm
Mo
+ (yo[k]− yobst[k]) cos 2πm
Mo
> Robst −Hbm[k]
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mo}, (14)
where H is a large positive number taken to be larger than the
maximum dimension of the vehicle’s operating environment
plus the radius of the obstacle. If bm[k] = 1, the right hand side
of the inequality is a large, negative number that is always less
than the left hand side. In this case, the inequality is inactive
because it is trivially satisfied. If bm[k] = 0, the inequality is
said to be active because it reduces to an inequality from the
existence condition above. For obstacle avoidance, at least one
of the constraints in equation (14) must be active. To enforce
this, we introduce the following inequality constraint into the
problem formulation,
Mo∑
m=1
bm[k] ≤Mo − 1. (15)
Therefore, to enforce obstacle avoidance at time to[k], the
set of binary variables {bm[k]}Mom=1 and the constraints given
by equations (14) and (15) are added to the MILP problem
formulation.
Consider the example problem from Section II with obsta-
cles. In this problem, we want to transfer the vehicle from
start state xs to finish state xf in time tf using minimal
control effort while avoiding obstacles. To enforce obstacle
avoidance at each time in the set {to[k]}Nok=1, we augment the
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Fig. 2. Plots of the minimum control effort obstacle avoidance example. The
shaded region is the obstacle to be avoided and the ×’s along the trajectory
denote the avoidance points (xo[k], yo[k]). Figure (a) is the original solution.
Figure (b) is the solution after two steps of the iterative obstacle avoidance
algorithm. The ✸’s are the avoidance points added to the MILP formulation
by the iterative algorithm. The values for the parameters are Nu = 10,
Mu = 20, Tu[k] = 0.3 for all k, Mo = 10, No = 10, to[k] = kT ,
(xs, ys, x˙s, y˙s) = (−0.25,−0.2,−0.5,−0.2), and (xf , yf , x˙f , y˙f ) =
(0.4, 0.3, 0.0, 0.0).
MILP formulation in Section II with the set of binary variables
{bm[k]}Mom=1, constraints (14), and constraint (15) for all k in
the set {1, . . . , No}.
Distributing the avoidance times uniformly (uniform grid-
ding), as in [34], [16], results in a trajectory that avoids
obstacles at each discrete time in the set, but the trajectory
can collide with obstacles between avoidance times. This
is shown for an example instance in Figure 2(a). In this
example, the trajectory intersects the obstacle between the
sixth and seventh avoidance time steps. A simple method
to eliminate this behavior is to represent the obstacle with
a polygon that is larger than the obstacle. Then distribute
obstacle avoidance times uniformly such that the sampling
time is small enough to guarantee avoidance. In general, this
is not a desirable approach because it results in large MILPs
that require significant computational effort to solve.
A better approach is to select the avoidance times intelli-
gently. In [17], we have developed an iterative MILP algorithm
that does this. We summarize this algorithm here. First, pick
an initial set of times {to[k]}Nok=1 at which obstacle avoidance
will be enforced. Then, formulate and solve the MILP as
described above representing the obstacles with polygons
slightly larger than the obstacles. Next, check the resulting
trajectory for collisions with any of the obstacles (not the
polygons which represent them in the MILP). If there are
no collisions, terminate the algorithm. If there is a collision,
compute the time intervals for which collisions occur denoting
the time interval for collision i by (t(i)a , t(i)b ). For each interval
i, pick a time within the interval, such as (t(i)a + t(i)b )/2. At
each of these times add obstacle avoidance constraints to the
MILP formulation. Then, solve the augmented MILP repeating
the procedure above (first checking if the resulting trajectory
intersects any obstacles, etc.) until a collision free trajectory
is found. Figure 2(b) shows the effectiveness of this algorithm
after two iterations.
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Fig. 3. The RoboFlag Drill used to motivate the methods presented is this
paper. The drill takes place on a playing field with a Defense Zone at its
center. The objective is to design a cooperative control strategy for the team
of defending vehicles (black) that minimizes the number of attacking vehicles
(white) that enter the Defense Zone.
IV. ROBOFLAG PROBLEMS
To motivate our multi-vehicle methods, we apply them to
simplified versions of the RoboFlag game [12], [13], [10],
which we call RoboFlag Drills because they serve as practice
for the real game. The drills involve two teams of robots,
the defenders and the attackers, on a playing field with a
circular region of radius Rdz at its center called the Defense
Zone, as shown in Figure 3. The attackers’ objective is to
fill the Defense Zone with as many attackers as possible.
The defenders’ objective is to deny as many attackers from
entering the Defense Zone as possible without entering the
zone themselves. We consider Defensive Drill problems in
which each attacker has a fixed intelligence governed by a
state machine. The goal is to design a team control strategy for
the defenders that maximizes the number of attackers denied
from the Defense Zone. In this section, we use MILP methods
to generate such strategies. We consider two versions of the
Defensive Drill each with a different set of laws governing
attacker intelligence.
To start, we consider one-on-one Defensive Drill problems.
This is the simplest case and involves one defender and one
attacker. Although this case is not particularly interesting, we
start with it for notational clarity. Next, we generalize to the
case involving ND defenders and NA attackers, which is a
straightforward extension.
A. Defensive Drill 1: one-on-one case
The defender is governed by the discrete time dynamical
system from Section II
xu[k + 1] = A[k]xu[k] +B[k]u[k]
xu[0] = xs
ux[k] sin
2πm
Mu
+ uy[k] cos
2πm
Mu
≤ cos π
Mu
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mu}
(in Defenze Zone)
or (intercepted)
[k]=1a a [k]=0
otherwise any
inactiveattack
Fig. 4. The two state (attack and inactive) attacker state machine. The attacker
starts in the attack state. It transitions to the inactive state, and remains in this
state, if it enters the Defense Zone or if it is intercepted by the defender.
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , Nu}. (16)
The attacker has two discrete modes: attack and inactive.
When in attack mode, it moves toward the Defense Zone
at constant velocity along a straight line path. The attacker,
initially in attack mode at the beginning of play, transitions to
inactive mode if the defender intercepts it or if it enters the
Defense Zone. Once inactive, the attacker does not move and
remains inactive for the remainder of play. These dynamics
are captured by the following discrete time equations and state
machine
p[k + 1] = p[k] + vpTa[k]a[k]
q[k + 1] = q[k] + vqTa[k]a[k] (17)
a[k + 1] =


1 if (a[k] = 1)
and (not in Defense Zone)
and (not intercepted)
0 if (a[k] = 0)
or (in Defense Zone)
or (intercepted)
(18)
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , Na}
with initial conditions
p[0] = ps, q[0] = qs, and a[0] = 1, (19)
where Na is the number of samples, k ∈ {1, . . . , Na},
Ta[k] > 0 is the time between samples k and k+1, (p[k], q[k])
is the attacker’s position at time ta[k] =
∑k−1
i=0 Ta[i], (vp, vq)
is its constant velocity vector, and a[k] ∈ {0, 1} is a discrete
state indicating the attacker’s mode. The attacker is in attack
mode when a[k] = 1 and inactive mode when a[k] = 0. The
attacker state machine is shown in Figure 4. Here we use the
subscript a to denote the time discretization for the attacker’s
dynamics.
Defense Zone
Because the defender wants to keep the attacker from enter-
ing the Defense Zone, a binary variable indicating whether or
not the attacker is inside the Defense Zone is introduced. This
variable is used to define the attacker state machine precisely.
We denote the binary variable with γ[k] ∈ {0, 1}. When the
attacker is in the Defense Zone at step k, γ[k] = 1. When the
attacker is outside the Defense Zone at step k, γ[k] = 0.
Similar to the approach used to define obstacles, the Defense
Zone is approximated using a polygon G defined by a set of
6Mdz inequalities
G := { (x¯, y¯) :
x¯ sin
2πm
Mdz
+ y¯ cos
2πm
Mdz
≤ Rdz
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz} }. (20)
The association between γ[k] and G is
(γ[k] = 1) ⇐⇒ (p[k], q[k]) ∈ G. (21)
If the defender keeps the binary variable γ[k] equal to 0 for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , Na}, it has successfully denied the attacker
from the region G and thus from the Defense Zone. However,
in order to use the binary variable γ[k] in the problem
formulation, we must enforce the logical constraint given by
equation (21). To enforce this constraint in MILP, we convert
it into an equivalent set of inequality constraints.
We introduce the binary variable gm[k] ∈ {0, 1} to indicate
whether or not the mth constraint of G is satisfied by the
attacker with position (p[k], q[k]). This association is made
by introducing the logical constraint
(gm[k] = 1) ⇐⇒(
p[k] sin
2πm
Mdz
+ q[k] cos
2πm
Mdz
≤ Rdz
)
. (22)
As shown in Appendix I, it is equivalent to the following set
of inequalities
p[k] sin
2πm
Mdz
+ q[k] cos
2πm
Mdz
≤ Rdz +H(1 − gm[k])
p[k] sin
2πm
Mdz
+ q[k] cos
2πm
Mdz
≥ Rdz + ǫ − (H + ǫ)gm[k], (23)
where ǫ is a small positive number and H is a large positive
number such that the left hand sides of the inequalities are
bounded from above by H and from below by −H .
Using binary variable gm[k], we can write equation (21) as
(γ[k] = 1) ⇐⇒
(gm[k] = 1 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz}), (24)
which is equivalent to the inequality constraints
gm[k]− γ[k] ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz}
Mdz∑
i=1
(1− gi[k]) + γ[k] ≥ 1, (25)
as shown in Appendix I.
The logical constraint given by equation (21) is equivalent
to the inequality constraints given by equations (23) and (25).
Therefore, we can include the indicator variable γ[k] in the
MILP formulation by also including the binary variables
{gm[k]}Mam=1 and constraints (23) and (25).
Intercept Region
To define what it means for a defender to intercept an
attacker, we introduce an intercept region I[k] rigidly attached
to the defending robot. The intercept region is a polygon
defined by a set of MI inequalities. If an attacker is in this
polygon, it is considered intercepted. For the defender with
coordinates (xa[k], ya[k]), the intercept region is given by
I[k] := { (x¯, y¯) :
(x¯− xa[k]) sin 2πm
MI
+ (y¯ − ya[k]) cos 2πm
MI
≤ RI
∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,MI} }, (26)
where xa[k] = x(ta[k]) and ya[k] = y(ta[k]) are calculated
using equation (7), and RI is the inscribed radius of the
polygon.
The binary variable δ[k] ∈ {0, 1} is introduced to indicate
whether or not the attacker is inside the defender’s intercept
region. The association is made with the following logical
constraint
δ[k] = 1 ⇐⇒ (p[k], q[k]) ∈ I[k]. (27)
Using techniques similar to those used for γ[k], we convert
this constraint into an equivalent set of inequality constraints
as follows: For each of the inequalities defining the intercept
region, we associate a binary variable dm[k] ∈ {0, 1} by
introducing the logical constraint
(dm[k] = 1) ⇐⇒(
(p[k]− xa[k]) sin 2πm
MI
+ (q[k]− ya[k]) cos 2πm
MI
≤ RI
)
, (28)
where (p[k], q[k]) are the coordinates of the attacking robot.
If dm[k] = 1, the coordinates of the attacking robot satisfy
the mth inequality defining the intercept region. If dm[k] = 0,
the mth inequality is not satisfied. Similar to equation (22),
we can express this logic constraint as the set of inequalities
(p[k]− xa[k]) sin 2πm
MI
+ (q[k]− ya[k]) cos 2πm
MI
≤ RI +H(1− dm[k])
(p[k]− xa[k]) sin 2πm
MI
+ (q[k]− ya[k]) cos 2πm
MI
≥ RI + ǫ− (H + ǫ)dm[k]. (29)
Using the binary variables dm[k] we can write equation (27)
as
δ[k] = 1 ⇐⇒ (dm[k] = 1 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,MI}). (30)
Considering both directions of this equivalence, as done for
γ[k] above, we find that the statement is equivalent to the
following set of inequality constraints
dm[k]− δ[k] ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,MI}
MI∑
i=1
(1− di[k]) + δ[k] ≥ 1. (31)
We can use δ[k] in our problem formulation if we include the
binary variables {dm[k]}Mam=1 and the inequalities constraints
given by equations (29) and (31).
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Fig. 5. The two state attacker state machine, as in Figure 4, using binary
variables δ[k] and γ[k].
State machine and objective function
With the indicator variables γ[k] and δ[k] defined, we revisit
the attacker state machine and define it more precisely with
the following state equation
a[k + 1] =


1 if a[k] = 1 and γ[k] = 0
and δ[k] = 0
0 if a[k] = 0 or γ[k] = 1
or δ[k] = 1,
(32)
which is shown in Figure 5. The state equations can be written
as the logical expression
(a[k + 1] = 1) ⇐⇒
(a[k] = 1 and γ[k] = 0 and δ[k] = 0), (33)
which is equivalent to the set of inequality constraints
a[k + 1] + δ[k] ≤ 1
a[k + 1]− a[k] ≤ 0
a[k + 1] + γ[k] ≤ 1
a[k]− δ[k]− γ[k]− a[k + 1] ≤ 0, (34)
as shown in Appendix I.
We have defined the dynamics of the defenders and the
attackers, and we have converted these dynamics to MILP
form. The final step in formulating Defensive Drill 1 is to
introduce an objective function that captures the defender’s
desire to deny the attacker from entering the Defense Zone.
This objective is achieved by minimizing the binary variable
γ[k] over the duration of the drill, which is captured by
minimizing the function
J =
Na∑
k=1
γ[k]. (35)
We set the duration of the drill such that
ta[Na] ≥
√
p2s + q
2
s
v2p + v
2
q
. (36)
This allows the attacker enough time to reach the Defense
Zone if it is not intercepted.
In addition to intercepting the attacker, we would like to
conserve fuel as a secondary objective. One way to achieve this
is to add a small penalty on the control effort to the objective
function as follows:
J =
Na∑
k=1
γ[k] + ǫ
Nu−1∑
k=0
(|ux[k]|+ |uy[k]|) , (37)
where ǫ is taken to be a small positive number because
we want the minimization of the binary variable γ[k] to
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Fig. 6. The defender denies the attacker from entering the Defense Zone.
The ∗’s along the attacker’s trajectory denote the attacker’s position for each
time ta[k]. The polygons along the defender’s trajectory denote the intercept
region I[k] for each time ta[k]. The ×’s denote obstacle avoidance points.
dominate. We use the procedure outlined in Section II to
write equation (37) in MILP form.
Summary and example
We have formulated Defensive Drill 1 as the following
optimization problem: minimize (37) subject to defender
dynamics (16); attacker dynamics (17), (19), and (34) for
all k ∈ {1, . . .Na}; the constraints for the γ[k] indicator
variable (23) and (25) for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz} and for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , Na}; the constraints for the δ[k] indicator
variable (29), and (31) for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,MI} and for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , Na}; and the avoidance constraints for the
Defense Zone (14) and (15) for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mo} and for
all k ∈ {1, . . . , No}.
The solution to an instance of this problem is shown in
Figure 6. For this instance, the defender denies the attacker
from the Defense Zone (shaded polygon) by intercepting
it. Each asterisk along the attacker’s trajectory denotes the
position of the attacker at sample time ta[k]. The white
polygons along the defender’s trajectory denotes the intercept
region I[k] at time ta[k].
B. Defensive Drill 2: one-on-one case
The dynamics of the defender are the same as the defender
dynamics in Section IV-A. The dynamics of the attacker are
the same as the attacker dynamics in Defensive Drill 1, but
with an additional state called retreat. If a defender is too close
to the attacker, the attacker enters the retreat state and reverses
direction. While retreating, if the defender is far enough away,
the attacker returns to attack mode.
These dynamics are captured by the following discrete time
equations and state machine:
p[k + 1] = p[k] + vpTa[k]a1[k]
− vpTa[k]a2[k]
q[k + 1] = q[k] + vqTa[k]a1[k]
− vqTa[k]a2[k] (38)
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inactiveattack
scored or intercepted
Fig. 7. The three state (attack, inactive, and retreat) attacker state machine.
The attacker starts in the attack state.
a1[k + 1] =


1 if [(a1[k] = 1 and a2[k] = 0)
or (a1[k] = 0 and a2[k] = 1)]
and (not scored)
and (not intercepted)
and (not in warning region)
0 otherwise
(39)
a2[k + 1] =


1 if [(a1[k] = 0 and a2[k] = 1) or
(a1[k] = 1 and a2[k] = 0)]
and (not scored)
and (not intercepted)
and (in warning region)
0 otherwise
(40)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , Na} and subject to the constraint
a1[k] + a2[k] ≤ 1 (41)
and the initial conditions
p[0] = ps, q[0] = qs, a1[0] = 1, a2[0] = 0. (42)
The state machine is shown in Figure 7.
The attacker needs two binary state variables because it
has three discrete modes of operation: attack, retreat, and
inactive. These modes are represented by (a1[k], a2[k]) =
(1, 0), (a1[k], a2[k]) = (0, 1), and (a1[k], a2[k]) = (0, 0),
respectively. Because the state (a1[k], a2[k]) = (1, 1) is
not needed, we impose the inequality constraint given by
equation (41).
To determine if the defender is too close to the attacker, a
warning region is introduced. The warning region W [k] is a
polygon defined by a set of inequalities similar to the intercept
region I[k]. We introduce binary auxiliary variables wm[k]
and ω[k], and we introduce inequality constraints similar to
equations (29) and (31). The result is the following association
for indicator variable ω[k]: If ω[k] = 1, the defender is in the
attacker’s warning region at step k, otherwise, ω[k] = 0. The
attacker state machine can be written as the set of inequality
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Fig. 8. The solution to an instance of Defensive Drill 2. Figure (a) shows the
playing field. Each polygon along the attacker’s trajectory is a warning region.
Figure (b) shows the attacker’s distance from the center of the Defense Zone
versus time. The parameters are Mo = 8, Mu = 4, MI = 8, Mw = 8,
Mdz = 8, Nu = 4, No = 4, Na = 10, x0 = (−.36, .02,−.12,−.22),
and (p0, q0, va) = (1.15,−.4,−.11).
constraints
a1[k + 1]− a1[k] + a2[k] + γ[k] + δ[k] + ω[k] ≥ 0
a1[k + 1] + a1[k]− a2[k] + γ[k] + δ[k] + ω[k] ≥ 0
a2[k + 1] + a1[k]− a2[k] + γ[k] + δ[k]− ω[k] ≥ −1
a2[k + 1]− a1[k] + a2[k] + γ[k] + δ[k]− ω[k] ≥ −1
a1[k + 1] + a1[k] + a2[k] ≤ 2
a1[k + 1]− a1[k]− a2[k] ≤ 0
a1[k + 1] + γ[k] ≤ 1
a1[k + 1] + δ[k] ≤ 1
a1[k + 1] + ω[k] ≤ 1
a2[k + 1]− a1[k]− a2[k] ≤ 0
a2[k + 1] + a1[k] + a2[k] ≤ 2
a2[k + 1] + γ[k] ≤ 1
a2[k + 1] + δ[k] ≤ 1
a2[k + 1]− ω[k] ≤ 0. (43)
Similar to Defense Drill 1, Defense Drill 2 can be posed
as a MILP. The solution of an example instance is shown in
Figure 8.
C. ND-on-NA case
To generalize the problem formulation to ND defenders
and NA attackers, we need to add more variables. Defender
i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , ND}, has state xui[k], control input
ui[k], and slack variables zxi[k] and zyi[k]. Attacker j, where
j ∈ {1, . . . , NA}, has state (pj [k], qj [k], aj[k]) and constant
velocity vector (vpj , vqj). The binary variable γj [k] equals 1
if and only if attacker j is in polygon G at step k. The binary
variable δij [k] equals 1 if and only if attacker j is in defender
i’s intercept region Ii[k] at step k. The binary variables gmj[k],
dmij [k], and bmi[k] follow a similar trend. For Defensive Drill
2, we also need ωij [k] = 1 if and only if defender i is in
attacker j’s warning region Wj [k] at step k. And similarly for
the binary variable wmij [k].
With the variables for the general case defined, inequality
constraints are added to the formulation in a similar way
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Fig. 9. The solution to four instances of Defensive Drill 1. For Figures (a)
and (b), NA = 3 and ND = 1. For Figures (c) and (d), NA = 4 and
ND = 2. In Figures (a) and (c), the defenders deny all attackers from the
Defense Zone. In Figures (b) and (d), an attacker enters the Defense Zone.
as those derived for the one-on-one case. For example, the
constraints identifying γj [k] = 1 with (pj [k], qj [k]) ∈ G are
gmj [k]− γj [k] ≥ 0 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz}
Mdz∑
l=1
(1 − glj[k]) + γj [k] ≥ 1,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , Na} and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , NA}.
And finally, the objective function is given by
J =
NA∑
j=1
Na∑
k=1
γj [k] + ǫ
ND∑
i=1
Nu−1∑
k=0
(|uxi[k]|+ |uyi[k]|) . (44)
Results for example instances of Defensive Drill 1 are
shown in Figure 9. Results for Defensive Drill 2 are shown in
Figure 10.
V. AVERAGE CASE COMPLEXITY
In this section, we explore the average case complexity of
Defensive Drill 1 by solving randomly generated instances.
Each instance is generated by randomly picking parameters
from a uniform distribution over the intervals defined below.
Each MILP is solved using AMPL [19] and CPLEX [22] on a
PC with Intel PIII 550MHz processor, 1024KB cache, 3.8GB
RAM, and Red Hat Linux. For all instances solved, processor
speed was the limiting factor, not memory.
To generate the initial condition (ps, qs) and the constant
velocity vector (vp, vq) for each attacker we pick ra, θa, and
va randomly from a uniform distribution over the intervals
[rmina , r
max
a ], [0, 2π), and [vmina , vmaxa ], respectively. The pa-
rameters are then given by
ps = ra cos θa, qs = ra sin θa
vp = vaps/
√
p2s + q
2
s , vq = vaqs/
√
p2s + q
2
s . (45)
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Fig. 10. The solution to two instances of Defensive Drill 2. Figures (a) and
(c) show the playing field. Figures (b) and (d) show each attacker’s distance
from the center of the Defense Zone versus time.
To generate the initial condition (xs, ys, x˙s, y˙s) for each
defender, we pick rd, θd, vd, and θv randomly from a
uniform distribution over the intervals [rmind , rmaxd ], [0, 2π),
[vmind , v
max
d ], and [0, 2π), respectively. The defender’s initial
condition is then given by
xs = rd cos θd, ys = rd sin θd
x˙s = vd cos θv, y˙s = vd sin θv. (46)
We take the playing field to be circular with radius Rf = 15,
and we set the radius of the Defense Zone to be Rdz =
2. The intervals used to generate the instances are rd ∈
[
√
2Rdz, 2
√
2Rdz], vd ∈ [0.5, 1.0], and ra ∈ [Rf/2, Rf ]. We
take the attacker velocity to be va = 1.0.
In Figure 11, we plot the fraction of instances solved versus
computation time for the case where the cost function includes
the number of attackers that enter the Defense Zone plus
a penalty on the control effort. This cost function is given
by equation (44) with ǫ = 0.1. In Figure 12, we plot the
fraction of instances solved versus computation time for the
case where the cost function includes only the number of
attackers that enter the Defense Zone. This cost function is
given by equation (44) with ǫ = 0.
As these figures show, the case where the cost function
only includes the number of attackers that enter the Defense
Zone is less computationally intensive than the case where the
cost function also includes a penalty on the control effort. For
example, for the case where ǫ = 0, ND = 3, and NA = 4,
50% of the problems are solved in 3.5 seconds. However, for
the case where ǫ = 0.1, ND = 3, and NA = 4, 50% of the
problems are solved in 78 seconds.
When ǫ = 0 in the cost function, the solver stops once a
set of trajectories for the defenders is found that results in the
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Fig. 11. Fraction of instances solved versus computation time. The cost
function is the number of attackers that enter the Defense Zone plus a penalty
on control effort (equation (44) with ǫ > 0). We consider instances with
defender set of size three (ND = 3) and attacker sets of size NA =
1, 2, 3, 4, 5. To generate each curve, 200 random instances were solved. The
parameters are Mu = 4, MI = 4, Mdz = 4, Nu = 15, and Na = 15.
minimum number of attackers entering the Defense Zone. This
trajectory is often not the most efficient trajectory with respect
to the control effort of the defenders. For the case where ǫ =
0.1, once a set of defender trajectories is found that results in
the minimum number of attackers entering the Defense Zone
the solver continues to search. The solver searches until it
finds a set of defender trajectories that not only results in the
minimum number of attackers entering the Defense Zone but
also uses the defender control effort in the most efficient way.
In Figure 13, we plot the computation time necessary to
solve 50% of the randomly generated instances versus the size
of the attacker set. For all instances considered, the defender
set is of constant size (ND = 3). We plot the data for both
cost functions considered above (ǫ = 0 and ǫ = 0.1). This
figure shows that the computation time grows exponentially
with the number of vehicles in the attacker set.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we showed how to use MILPs to model and
generate strategies for multi-vehicle control problems. The
MILP formulation is very expressive and allows all aspects
of the problem to be taken into account. This includes the
dynamic equations governing the vehicles, the dynamic equa-
tions governing the environment, the state machine governing
adversary intelligence, logical constraints, and inequality con-
straints. The solution to the resulting MILP is the optimal
team strategy for the problem. As shown by our average case
complexity study, the MILP method becomes computational
burdensome for large problems and thus, for these cases, is
not suitable for real-time applications.
There are several steps that can be taken to make the
MILP approach applicable for real-time multi-vehicle control
applications. One approach is to solve the MILPs faster.
This can be done by using a more powerful computer or
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Fig. 12. Fraction of instances solved versus computation time. The cost
function is the number of attackers that enter the Defense Zone (equation (44)
with ǫ = 0). We consider instances with defender set of size three (ND = 3)
and attacker sets of size NA = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. To generate each curve, 200
random instances were solved. The parameters are Mu = 4, MI = 4, Mdz =
4, Nu = 15, and Na = 15.
by distributing the computation over a set of processors. For
the multi-vehicle control problems, it may be advantageous to
distribute the computation over the set of vehicles. Distributed
methods for solving MILPs have been considered in [31].
Another approach is to move all, or some components
of, the computational burden offline. This can be done by
formulating the problem as a multi-parametric MILP. A multi-
parametric MILP is a MILP formulated using a set of param-
eters each allowed to take on values over an interval. This
problem is much more computationally intensive than the
MILP problems considered in this paper. However, because
the computation is performed offline, this is not an issue
unless the computation takes an unreasonable amount of time.
With the solution to the multi-parametric MILP, a table can
be formed and used to look up optimal team strategies for
the multi-vehicle system in real time. Multi-parametric MILP
control problems can be solved using the Multi-Parametric
Toolbox [23].
Finally, we discuss efficient MILP formulations as a way
of decreasing computational requirements. The computational
effort required to solve a MILP depends most on the number
of binary variables used in its MILP problem formulation.
Thus, reducing the number of binary variables is advantageous.
In this paper, our motivating problem required three different
time discretizations. The discretizations included one for the
control input to the vehicles, one for obstacle avoidance, and
one for attacker intercept. With each discretization step, a set
of binary variables must be added to the MILP formulation.
In most of the instances solved in this paper, we discretized
time uniformly. However, we posed the MILP in a general
way such that nonuniform time discretizations could be used.
This allows for intelligent time distribution selection, which
can significantly reduce the required computational effort to
solve a problem. In [17], we developed several iterative MILP
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Fig. 13. Computation time necessary to solve 50% of the randomly generated
instances versus the number of attackers. For all instances, the defender set is
of size three (ND = 3). Each square denotes a data point for the case where
the cost function is the number of attackers that enter the Defense Zone plus
a penalty on each defender’s control effort (ǫ = 0.1 case). Each asterisk
denotes a data point for the case where the cost function is the number of
attackers that enter the Defense Zone (ǫ = 0 case). The solid lines denote
fitted exponential functions to these data.
techniques for intelligent discretization step selection.
APPENDIX I
In this appendix, we illustrate how to convert a logic
expression into an equivalent set of inequalities using the
procedure from [40]. First the logic expression is converted
into a conjunction of disjunctions, called conjunctive normal
form (CNF), by applying tautologies. For example, let the
variables pi ∈ {0, 1} be binary variables. The expression
((p1 = 1) or (p2 = 1))
and ((p3 = 0) or (p2 = 1))
and ((p4 = 1) or (p5 = 1) or (p6 = 0)) (47)
is in CNF.
Once we have converted the logic expression into CNF we
can easily write each disjunction as an inequality constraint
that must be satisfied in order for the disjunction to be true. For
example, the second disjunction of equation (47), ((p3 = 0) or
(p2 = 1)), is true if and only if (1− p3) + p2 ≥ 1. Therefore,
equation 47 is true if and only if the following inequalities
hold
p1 + p2 ≥ 1
(1− p3) + p2 ≥ 1
p4 + p5 + (1− p6) ≥ 1. (48)
A. Equation (24)
First consider the (⇒) direction of equation (24). Replacing
implication with disjunction we have
(γ[ka] = 1) or
(gm[ka] = 1 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz}) (49)
and distributing the OR we have
(γ[ka] = 0 or gm[ka] = 1) ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz} (50)
which is equivalent to
(γ[ka] = 0 or g1[ka] = 1)
and (γ[ka] = 0 or g2[ka] = 1)
.
.
.
and (γ[ka] = 0 or gMdz [ka] = 1) . (51)
This expression is in CNF, therefore it is equivalent to the
following set of inequality constraints
(1 − γ[ka]) + gm[ka] ≥ 1 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz}. (52)
Now consider the (⇐) direction of equation (24). Replacing
implication with disjunction
(γ[ka] = 1) or
¬(gm[ka] = 1 ∀m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mdz}) (53)
and distributing the negation we have
(γ[ka] = 1) or (∃m such that gm[ka] = 0) . (54)
which is equivalent to
(γ[ka] = 1)
or (g1[ka] = 0)
or (g2[ka] = 0)
.
.
.
or (gMdz [ka] = 0) . (55)
This expression, which is a disjunction, is in CNF and there-
fore is equivalent to the following inequality
Mdz∑
i=1
(1− gi[ka]) + γ[ka] ≥ 1. (56)
B. Equation (33)
First consider the (⇒) direction of equation (33). Replacing
implication with the equivalent disjunction we have
(a[ka + 1] = 0) or
(a[ka] = 1 and γ[ka] = 0 and δ[ka] = 0) (57)
and distributing OR over AND we have
(a[ka + 1] = 0 or δ[ka] = 0)
and (a[ka + 1] = 0 or a[ka] = 1)
and (a[ka + 1] = 0 or γ[ka] = 0) . (58)
Now that the expression is in CNF we can easily write it as
a set of inequality constraints.
(1− a[ka + 1]) + (1− δ[ka]) ≥ 1
(1− a[ka + 1)) + a[ka] ≥ 1
(1− a[ka + 1)) + (1− γ[ka]) ≥ 1. (59)
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Now consider the other direction (⇐) of equation (33).
Replacing the implication with disjunction we have
(a[ka + 1] = 1) or
¬ (δ[ka] = 0 and a[ka] = 1 and γ[ka] = 0) (60)
and distributing the negation we have
δ[ka] = 1 or a[ka] = 0 or γ[ka] = 1 or a[ka + 1] = 1 (61)
this disjunction is equivalent to the flowing inequality
δ[ka] + (1− a[ka]) + γ[ka] + a[ka + 1] ≥ 1. (62)
In summary, we have taken the governing equations for the
attacker’s binary state (32) and derived an equivalent set of
inequalities: (59) and (62) which can be simplified to the
inequalities given by equation (34).
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